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The economists' characterization of production and distribution of
output in agrarian economic systems, based upon the neoclassical competi
tive model, has differed rather sharply from the point of view stressed
by many non-economists.

The alternative view centers around the idea of

a powerful landlord class subjugating and exploiting a large but powerless peasant labor class.

1

As if this attack from the distributional per-

spective were not enough, social reformers were joined by eminent econo
mists who argued that one widely used agrarian institution, sharecropping,
is productively inefficient.

2

This two tiered attack upon an economic in

stitution so prevalent in virtually all regions of the world throughout
the history of organized agricultural production could not coexist peace
fully with received economic doctrine.

The reason being that neither ex

ploitation nor inefficiency have a place in competitive markets.

Recent

ly there have been a collection of spirited'defenses of the institution
of sharecropping within the framework of competitive markets. 3

The first

attack upon the common view was put forth by Steven S. Cheung.

Cheung es

sentially argued that since exploitation and inefficiency could not per-

sist in a competitive market, and sharecropping did exist, it must not be

1

A representation of such viewpoints can be found in Breman [2] and
Feder [SJ.

2

The list begins with Adam Smith. Amon~ contemporary economists, we
find A.K. Sen, P.K. Bardhan, and T.N. Srinivasan.
3

See Cheung [3] and Reid [14].

-2inefficient.

The only task that had to be faced was to show how share

cropping could be efficient within the framework of a competitive model.
The source of the putative inefficiency, as pointed out by Adam Smith, was
that since a sharecropper would receive only a fraction of the total
fruits of his labor he would quite naturally undersupply labor to share
cropped land.

However, Alfred Marshall, and later D. Gale Johnson point

ed out that if the landlord could stipulate and enforce the labor supply
of the tenant this inefficiency might not exist.

4

This was the procedure

taken by Cheung who along with others produced evidence that contractual
stipulation and enforcement of tenant activities is precisely what land
lords did.

Under the assumption that landlords can costlessly enforce

stipulated tenant labor supplies to leased land, Cheung and others have
developed models showing that sharecropping is efficient.

One by-prod-

uct of Cheung's approach is t~e proposition, stated by David M.G. Newberry,
that Cheung's sharecropping equilibrium is exactly equivalent in its ef
ficiency and distributive effects to a competitive equilibrium.

This re

sult is hardly surprising since the Cheung competitive approach has
landlords choosing the contractual parameters of a sharing arrangement
subject to the constraint that accepting tenants receive an income, or
more generally an expected utility level, greater than or equal to that
they could earn by working for a competitively determined wage.
Using Cheung's notation let each farm have the production function
q

4

~

q(h,T), where q is output, h land, and T labor.

Let H equal landowners

[9,8].
In fact, in a footnote I discovered after writing this paper,
Marshall comes close to anticipating some of the major points of this
paper. See below.

-3total landholding and m the number of tenancies leased so that h =

!!..
m

Suppose that w is a competitively determined wage available to the tenant
and (1-r) the tenant's share of output.

max

Cheung has the landlord maximize

Rs m•r•q(h,T)

{m,r,T}
subject to wT = (1-r)q(h,T).

Even before the Lagrangian is formed and the maximization taken it is a
foregone conclusion that the wage will equal the marginal product of labor
and rent per acre will equal the marginal product of land.

David M.G.

Newberry using essentially Cheung's model allows tenants to maximize own
income by choosing over all landlords offerings.
sentation in this process is superfluous.

But the tenant's repre

Tenant's make no real choices

as to labor supply, but simply choose over the various all or nothing offers made unilaterally by landlords.

In a command society an income maxi

mizing dictator will choose an efficient allocation too.

The role of the

wage in Cheung's analysis is just to ensure efficiency.

The model is ad

hoc.

Why do not the landowners simply offer tenants the competitive wage?
Cheung's approach has not escaped criticism from other quarters.

P.K. Bardhan and T.N. Srinivasan (B-S) argue that the approach which has
landlords choosing the contractual terms subject to acceptance constraints
is in the spirit of monopolistic competition rather than perfect competi
tion.

I concur with this view.

But it must be recognized that the al

ternative model offered by B-S is as they admit not at all satisfactory.
The major problem with their model is that they attempt to treat the share
of output accruing to the tenant as a price-like parameter taken as market
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given by all participants.

Unfortunately, as Newberry points out this

parameter cannot be treated like a price.

It is closer in concept to a

contingent claim on output and in that sense resembles more a conunodity
or asset which might have a price rather than be a price itself. 5

In the

first section of this paper I present a competitive sharecropping model
that seems to me to be as close as possible to the spirit of competition
envisioned by economists.

All agents are assumed to be contract takers

in a way perfectly analogous to price taking assumptions.

It is shown in

that section that a sharecropping contract equilibrium is identical to a
competitive equilibrium.

This result is in no way ad hoc.

It can be ob

tained even in the case where there does not exist a competitive wage or
any other competitive parameter other than contracts.

In that sense the

model illustrates precisely why the sharecropping competitive equilibrium
equivalency result must go throug;h.
The equivalence of sharecropping and competitive wage-rental mar
kets establishes the productive efficiency of sharecropping, but it cre
ates a new problem at least as big as the one it solves.

In light of the

equivalency result one may certainly ask why do any ap,ents choose share
cropping as opposed to the wage-rental system.

The following section

briefly discusses the traditional explanations for the use of the insti
tution of sharecropping and finds them lacking.

Put succinctly share

cropping is an irrelevant institution in the context of competitive mar
kets.

5 This essential aspect of the problem is made clear by both Newberry [12)
and Stiglitz [17).

-5This means that any attempt to explain the incidence of sharecrop
ping must be based on the existence of some market imperfection.

In the

third section of the paper it is shown that if capital is used in the pro
duction process and landlord and tenant share in the cost of capital, ef
ficiency requires that each receives a share of output equal to his share
of capital costs.

If the market for capital is imperfect, capital ration

ed landowners and capital holding tenants will both gain by entering share
cropping arrangements.

Thus the explanation of sharecropping offered here

is based upon a model of capital rationing.

In the major section a very

simple model of agrarian production in the presence of an imperfect capi
tal market is presented.

A few basic propositions of the model are deriv

ed and it is argued that these implications fit the known empirical evi
dence much better than the conclusions reached by assuming perfect com
petition.
Competitive Contracting
In this section I develop and analyze a simple agrarian economy
with sharecropping under assumptions which I believe conform as closely

as possible to the economists' notion of perfect competition.

The sine

qua non of perfect competition is the assumption of price-taking behavior.
If the price-taking assumption is satisfied one need not make any addi
tional assumptions about the number of agents and the market power of each.

As discussed above share claims to output are not price like parameters
so we must find an alternative to the price taking hypothesis.

It seems

that the parallel assumption in the present context is a contract-taking
assumption.

A few definitions and assumptions are required before the

analysis can continue.

-6-

Assumption 1:

All farms produce a homogeneous consumption good with in
puts land d, and labor L. Each farm uses the same con
stant returns production function
F(d,L)

Definition 1 :

with intensive form

A share contract is a triple

{a,d,L}

Where a is the share of final output accruing to the ten
ant, dis the amount of land leased to the tenant, and L
is the stipulated labor supply of the tenant.
Under constant returns landlords are indifferent to offering m contracts
(a,d,L)with md = D; or stipulating contractual terms (a,t) and signing N
i i
contracts (a,d ,L) i=l, ... N with

If workers do not have identical preferences the latter arrangement will
not only be preferred by the market, but will be necessary if efficiency
is to result.
Let
{

C ..

·-

{

.}

.

(,-)

.]1
'JI,

J

}

j=l, •.•M

be the union of the set of all contracts offered by landowners.

6

-

Let C

With an increase in notational complexity the analysis below could have
been done using contracts {a,d,L}. In equilibrium it is easy to prove
all such contracts would satisfy the {a,t} condition above.

-7-

If w[c,C] cEC

be the set of all contracts that could possibly be offered.

is the profit obtained by a landlord who offers the contracts c given that
other landowners have offered C the problem of each independent landlord
is to
n[c,C].

Max
ce:C

This is a fair characterization of how a nonauctioneered (hence more real
istic) market might operate.

But an appropriate solution concept is not

the competitive equilibrium.

Some simple variant of this model is no doubt

the proper way to proceed.

However, economists have the paradigm of hypo

thesizing price taking or in this case contract-taking behavior and arguing
that the resulting equilibrium allocations are good approximations of the
allocations that would occur in the nonauctioneered case.

In this section

I stay within the confines of that paradigm which turns out to have quite a
lot

to teach us.

set of

r-nnt-..- .. r-t-c

I assume there is ~iven to the market at any time, a
C rnmpl,:,t-,:,ly defined hy ,.
a,

f11nrt-ion

a: [O,m)

-+

(0,..,).

That

is for each C (a,t)e:C if and only if a• a(t).
a
a
Assumption 2:

a'>O

for all a(•) considered.

Landlords
The landlords studied in this section are assumed to do no work.
They maximize the income from their land.

Under the competitive contract

taking assumption each landlord taking the set of contracts Ca , and there

-8-

fore a(l) as parametrically given must choose that subset of contracts in
C that maximizes her profit.
a

Let Dj be the total amount of land owned by

the jth landlord and p(t) equal the percentage of land leased under the
share contract (a(t), t).

Under assumption two there exists for each a(t)

a well defined inverse function t(a) mapping the unit interval into an in
terval of the real line with zero as its left end point.

The profit of

landlord j will be;

The income maximizing problem of a landlord is;
Max

11 [

a ( • ) , P ( •) ]

subject tos~P(t(x))dx = 1.

P( •)

This is a classical problem in the Calculus of Variations.

In the present

case it is easy to determine that the optimal solution is degenerate. 7
The Euler-Lagrange first order condition is
[1-a(t)]f(t)Dj • A

should be expected the landlord's income should be equal on every contract
offered.

Therefore, the problem is the far simpler one of
Max

[1-a(t)]f(t)Dj • n(a(•),1).

1

7

*
The optimal P(•) satisfies P(t)
wise.

s

l for some 1* and P(t) • 0 other-

-9-

The first order condition for this problem is;
[1-a(f.)]f'(.t) - a'(.t)f(t) • O.

a)

The landlord equates her share of labor's marginal product to labor's
marginal share of output.

The first term is the landlord's gain from in

creasing labor on a unit of land, while the second term represents her
loss on all previous acres resulting from the increase in the share to
labor of fi~al output.

Landlord income maximization clearly requires

equalization of these two entities.
condition that a'{.t) >O.
where f'(t)

~

O.

Note the extreme importance of the

If a'• 0 the landlord would be choosing an 1

Such an attempt to exploit labor by requiring large

amounts of labor on small plots of land is prevented by the fact that as
t increases the tenant receives a larger share of output.

The varying

share percentage plays the role of a signalling device to aid producers
in making efficient allocation decisions.
Tenants
Tenants are assumed to be homogeneous as labor inputs, but hetero-

geneous with respect to preferences and alternative income opportunities.
The hth tenant has utility,

lf (c,1-L)
C•

where

L
2
f(d )d + H(L ,h)
1

-10-

C is tenant consumption, 1

the labor allocated and d the consequent land
12
.
demanded in the share contract (a,d • t); and 1 the labor allocated to
1
2

the alternative opportunity.

The alternative income activity produces

income as a function H(•h) of labor.
cave function of labor.

Assume that His an increasing con

Two interpretations are given below.

1)

H(L,h) = wL

2)

h
H(L,h) = F(d ,L ).

workers have the opportunity of working
at a wage win a competitive market.

1

1

some prospective tenants may be small
landowners with land holdings dh,

Each prospective tenant household takes C as given.
a

Under the

assumption of free noncooperative behavior each tenant prospect chooses
a,d,L ,L subject to the market contract set.
2 1

That is:

U[C,1-L].

The first order conditions for an interior solution are;
U_H' - U_ "" 0
C

b)

L

U (a'f + af') - U • 0
C
L

w.r.

c)

w. r.
d

a'(t)f(t) + a(l)f'(t) • a(t)f(l)
\
t

-11The first two familiar conditions state that the tenant equates his marg
inal rate of substitution between labor and consumption to the respective
marginal returns to labor for fixed d.
fixed 1

2

The third condition is that for

the tenant equates his total return per unit of labor (right

hand side) to the marginal return to labor.
Equilibril.D!l requires that there exist a contract set Ca* and as
sociated a * (•) such that for every set St of landlords offering a contract
[a * (t),t], there exists a set Dt of tenants with the supply of land equalling the demand by the subset D of consumers.
1
A)

-

and for every contract [a(t ' ) , t'] demanded by a subset D 'of tenants
1

there exists a subset St' of landlords with;'
B)

:a

The existence question will be tackled later in the paper.

In this sec-

tion I am concerned with the efficiency and income distributional proper-

ties of a competitive contract equilibrium (CCE).
Proposition 1:

*
If a(•)
generates a C.C.E. and
n(a * (•),1) is strictly--quasi-concave int;

n"<O
Then the equilibrium share system is efficient.
Proof:

By strict-Quasi-concavity there exists a unique t * which is
profit maximal for all landlords.

Therefore all landlords offer
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the same contractual terms

* * *
(a(t),t).
Since by assumption this contract supports an equilibrium all
tenants must also be selecting the same contract.

From the first

order conditions for profit maximization and tenant's utility con
ditions;

* = F
f'(.e,)

L

all tenants.

Also choice of the same contract by all agents means

*
f'(t)

C

*
f'(.e,)

on all farms.

Finally; consumer's conditions a' and b give,
all households.
Corollary:

Q.E.D.

A contract equilibrium is exactly equival~nt to a competi

tive equilibrium with wages!
Proof:

Set

w* ,::

By proposition one and concavity assumptions all first and
second order optimization conditions are satisfied.

From

the fact that we have a contract equilibrium it is easy
to see that demand and supply of labor are equated at w* .
Finally note that the income of a worker is
w*L*

-13by equations a and c.

A similar manipulation shows that

landlord income is equal to the competitive return to land.

Q.E.D.
One property of the model above is that it demonstrates clearly why
a competitive system with sharecropping must be equivalent to a competitive
system with wage labor.

The intuitive idea being that if agents can freely

choose among alternatives, and all are contract takers, equilibria must be
efficient.

Put another way we know that agent's first order maximization

conditions will equate private marginal rewards and costs.

If a market

structure is devised so that each agent is imputed, his full costs and re
turns at the margin, equilibrium in the sense that all individual choices
are aggregatively consistent must be Pareto efficient given convexity of
preferences and production sets.

This is the essence of the problem.

In

the model developed by Bardhan and Srinivasan the tenant's share percent
age does not depend upon other contractual parameters.
and c we see that if a'
ploit each other.

s

From equations a

O both landlords and tenants will attempt to ex

The landlord requiring a zero marginal product of labor

and the tenant a zero marginal product of land.

As David M.G. Ncwberrj

correctly points out these two requirements mean that equilibrium in the
B-S model will generally not exist.
The way out of this dilemma is to allow the share percentage to
vary with the other contractual parameters.

As mentioned earlier, the

fact that the share increases with 1 provides incentives for landlords to
provide each tenant with bigger plots of land.

They do not desire 1

a=

Alternatively, the same condition induces tenants to curtail their demand
for land since

-14Lim

L
a(-) =
d

d-+<»

o.

and
Lim
d-+0

L
a(-) = 1.
d

Finally the existence of a varying share rate makes it possible (in equil
ibrium a fact) that the tenant receives the full value of the marginal pro
duct of labor.

This condition is necessary for efficienc y and impossibl e

to achieve with a constant share rate when tenants make own labor-sup ply
decisions .
Remark 1:

The equivalen cy result makes it fairly easy to see that pro
ving the existence of a CCE is trivial. If w* is a competi
tive equilibriu m wage, .an equilibriu m share function is

Furthermo re by propositi on one and its corollary , all equilib
rium functions are of the above form. See figures one and two.
Below we shall see that the idea that the tenants share should
vary with contractu al inputs generaliz es in an important way.

Bardhan and Srinivasa n TP~ngnize d that the basic problem of share-

cropping in the simple two factor productio n model was one of incentive s.
Their major result was that a competiti ve share system fails to provide
appropria te incentive s.

D.M.G. Newberry criticize d their model arguin~

that such a system could not be stable.

The model presented here rests

upon the argument that if one is willing to make the competiti ve assump
tion in the formal sense that informati on is perfect and market contract

I.

-14a-

C

Figure One

L

f(-)•d*
a*(L/d*)
d*
.

=

w*L
.

L

Figure Two

I

I

[1-a*(L/D )]f(L/D)•D = F(L,D) - w*L

L

A . . . . hO CT -

-15parameters are guided by an Walrasian auctioneer, then inefficiency will not
result.
The preceeding section examined a model of a competitive share
contract economy.

The conclusions of the model confirmed the proposition

that a competitive system with sharecropping would be efficient.

Unfor

tunately the cost of the competitive assumption was extremely high.

Since

sharecropping was shown to be equivalent to a competitive wage system it
is an irrelevant institution whose existence remains to be explained.

The

two most common explanations are that share contracts provide an efficient
means of sharing risk and or an incentive .payment system when supervision
costs of using wage labor are prohibitively high.
ment is disposed of rather easily.

The risk sharing argu

As is well known the argument is that

the use of share contracts is a means by which landlord and tenant can
share some of the risk of agricultural uncertainty between one another.
To my knowledge it was first pointed out in a consistent way independently
by Joel D. Reid and J.E. Stiglitz, in the context of a mean-variance un
certainty model, that sharecropping offers no gains for sharing risk over
a competitive market with wages and rental contracts.
hind this is easy to outline.

The intuition be

Any share contract gives both the landlord

and tenant a fixed fraction of both the mean and standard deviation of re
turn emerging from a given allocation of resources.

Now consider the same

allocation of resources and consequently mean and standard deviation of
return.

Under a wage system the landlord bears all the risk, while the

tenant does so under a rental system.

Given a constant returns production

technology any division of the mean and standard deviation between the con
tractors can be arranged by putting a fraction of the given resources in
to a wage-payment system and the remaining fraction into a rental arrange-

-16ment.

Therefore introducing shares to a competitive wage-rental system

offers no advantages.a
The incentives argument is not as weak on theoretical grounds.

In

a world where monitoring costs are prohibitive a straight wage payment
But it is not clear that

system is not likely to be second-best optimal.
a fixed share system is second-best either.

From a theoretical perspec
However, any treatment

tive this issue is at the heart of the matter.

here would require a detailed digression and will not be attempted. 9
There are other problems of a similar nature.

If the primary motive for

offering share contracts is to provide labor incentives why does not the
landlord offer a comparable rental contract which is known to have full
efficiency properties?

If production is risky what is needed is a second

best insurance arrangement to supplement the rental system.

As alluded

to above, it is not at all clear that a fixed share system provides opti
mal insurance.

Any attempt to explain the existence of sharecropping must

abandon the assumption of perfectly competitive markets.

The risk-sharing

and incentives arguments are both approaches in this direction.

The first

arguing that markets for risk-bearing are incomplete and the second that
imperfect monitoring of tenants actions causes a market imperfection.
Neither of these attempts to introduce market impe~fections is consistent
with some important facts concerning
economies.

income distribution in agrarian

Both retain the basic competitive assumption that all laborers

8

A more general argument is contained in D.M.G. Newberry [11).

9

I pursue this issue in a forthcoming paper.

-17are free to choose any form of tenure.

The only constraints facing agents

are price and contractual parameters.· This assumption implies that in
equilibrium the returns to factors working under different tenure arrange
ments must be identi~al.

It is well known that in agrarian societies the

social hierarchy among tenure forms is:
1)

landowners

2)

renters

3)

sharecroppers

4)

wage laborers

The free choice or competitive assumption implies that this ranking is
only a social one.

Labor incomes in all tenant positions must be identical.

This implication is certainly contrary to the established view that the
social ordering· also describes the relative income ordering.

The issue

is a difficult empirical question to settle, but I should be very surpris
ed indeed if it were shown that the incomes of renters and wage laborers
adjusted for risk were comparable.

Any theory of production and distribu

tion in agrarian economies must provide an explanation of the tenure hierarchy,
In the next section I present a model of an agricultural economy
that is endowed with an imperfect credit market.

In fact I shall make

the extreme assumption that no organized credit market exists at a11.lO
This assumption while clearly overly strong gives results that correspond
precisely to a market where the extent of credit available to any borrower

10

This assumption will turn out not to be as extreme as it sounds. The
major argument of the paper is that a major function of share-contracts
is to extend credit and substitute for an incomplete capital market.

-18is a function of his endowment wealth (collateral).

Therefore, the reader

can give the model that interpretation without my having to introduce ad
ditional definitions and symbols.
Suppose that a third productive input is introduced to the economy.
Call this input capital.

A good example is fertilizer. 11

Suppose that ten

ant and landlord share the cost of capital with respective shares of b
and 1-b.

Suppose further that the amount of land leased to the tenant

and the required labor supply have been stipulated.

Since both partici

pants to the contract share in the cost of capital they must come to some
mutual agreement about the amount to be used.
unit of capital.

Let p be the price of a

A tenant with wealth w, will choose to

U EaiF(di,Li,Ki) - EbipKi, 1-ELi •
i

i

i i
subj. to tb •pK ~w.

i

i

Here the superscript i represents the contractual parameters in the ith
contract signed by the tenant.

The first order condition is

i 12
"' b p.

This gives immediately;
Proposition 2:

If the tenant chooses the quantity of a variable input

such as capital the optimal choice will be efficient if
and only if the tenant's share of the input cost is ex
actly equal to his share of output.
This result is intuitively obvious.

The tenant will choose to invest in

11

Actually I am retaining the assumption of a one good economy.
tal is both a consumable and an input.

12

This assumes an interior solution.
the landlord chooses Ki.

So capi

An exactly analogous result holds if

-19capital until the marginal return to capital accruing to him is just equal
to the marginal cost of capital to him.

It also illuminates why, when the

tenant chooses both labor and land inputs, he will generally under utilize
labor.

Since the tenant pays for the full cost of labor with his forgone

leisure proposition 2 implies that efficient choice requires that he re
ceive the full marginal return to labor.

The great simplicity of proposi

tion 2 makes the treatment or lack of treatment it has received in the
literature extremely surprising.
paper by Earl Heady.

The point was made in a somewhat obscure

Since then no well known paper on the subject has

recognized its extreme importance.

In the following section proposition

two will provide the basis for an alternative theory of land tenure ar
rangements in agriculture.
discern.

The reason behind this is not difficult to

Proposition two tells us that if a tenant has shared in the

cost of capital efficiency r~quires that he also share in the return to
capital, given that decisions about capital input are made jointly.
A major point to see in the model below is that although there are
strong elements of competition present, the economy is not perfectly com
petitive.

The nonexistence of a capital market, and the consequential

differential capacities of agents for providing capital differentiates
them in the eyes of landowners.

Differences in wealth, or more generally

capital endowments is one of the more important and most easily ascertain
able differences among prospective tenants.

Landlords attempting to maxi

mize the return on their land, capital, and time will take cognizance of
these differences with the result that tenants differing in some substan
tive

characteristic will generally be offered different sets of contracts

from which to choose.

Viewed in this way markets for tenancies should be

characterized not perfectly competitive, but monopolistically competitive.

-20-

Monopolistic Competition and the Choice of Land Tenure
This section provides a capital budgeting model of tenancy deter
mination.

The model is as simple as possible.

Further elaborations such

as the inclusion of a capital market may prove useful at some future time.
However, the basic implications of the model below will prove robust ex
cept for some fairly obvious qualifications due to uncertainty.13
The organization of production is for the agricultural entrepreneur
a formidable problem.

Especially in underdeveloped regions the farmer

must solve allocation problems similar to those faced by large multi-prod
uct firms, but often without the benefit of efficient competitive prices
to guide decision making.

If a landlord owns more land than she can work

with her household's labor a decision must be made about the disposition
of the extra land.

We observed above that if the economy is perfectly

competitive all the landlord need do is decide how much land to rent out
and how much wage-labor to hire.

In the presence of an incomplete or im

perfect capital market the problem is more complex.

A capital rationed

landlord will find it highly profitable to spread the capital at her dis
posal optimally.
In general any prospective tenant will present several characteris
tics that are of concern to landlords.

For example the landlord is highly

inquisitive about the number of able-bodied workers in the tenants house
hold and the number and condition of the households ploughs and artimal
stock.
season?

Does the household have wealth to feed itself during the production
Can it contribute to the cost of other variable inputs?

household with observable characteristics

13

e

For a

let the landlord offer a set

In the near future I plan to generalize the model to include many commodities and uncertainty. Such an undertaking is clearly desireable, but
the increase in mathematical sophistication required would, in my opinion,
tend to obscure the main ideas I wish to convey here.

-21of contracts C(0) from which the household may choose.

The problem for

the landlord is to choose a set of contracts C[6] for every vector of
characteristics.

In the present paper we shall allow tenants to differ

only with respect to wealth.
A tenan~y contract is described by six parameters, a, b, L, d, k,
and R.

Risa fixed payment, wage or rent, and the oth-er terms are as used

above.

Numerical parameters are not the only tenns in a contract.

Dur-

ing the course of the productive season a multitude of decisions must be
made.

Examples are, the crop mix, choice of seed varieties, fertilization,

irrigation and other technique choices.

The more of these activities the

landlord participates in the greater the drain on her energies and of course
the less time to devote to other tenancies.

In the present model the only

decision of this kind to be made is the choice of capital input.

There

fore, the disposition of the right of capital choice will be an important
contractual point.
Suppose a set of contracts Care available on the market.
subset of these offered to households with wealth w be C[w].

Let the

Then if

U(c,w) represents the utility of aw-household with the contract c

£

C [w],

we denote
U[C (w)] •

max U(c,w).

c£C[w]
We further define U[w] to be either a reservation utility below which a
w-household will migrate, or the minimum utility consistent with biologi
cal continuance.

All utility functions are assumed to be strictly concave

and twice continuously differentiable in all arguments.

Any agent seeking

to contract with aw-household must offer a utility level no less than
U[C(w)].

The offer curve of aw-household is defined implicitly by

-22U[aF(L,d,k) + w - bpk + R,L] -U[C(w)]

a

O.

We solve for a in terms of the other seven variables to obtain an explicit
algebraic representation of the offer curve.
a• a[L,d,k,b,w,R,U (••)],
The solution to the problem
C)

[1-a(•••••)]F(L ,d,k) - pk(l-b)-rd + R

Max
L,d,k,b,R

is easily seen to be equivalent to the solution to
[1-a]F(L,d,k) - pk(l-b) -rd+ R

Max
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subject to

a,L,d,k,b,R
U[aF(L,d,k) + w - pkb + R,L]

~

U(w,c)

which is unique since the objective function is quasi concave and the con
straint set strictly convex.

Denote the solution values by a(w),L(w),d(w),

b(w),k(w),R(w) and define
~(w,c) • [1-a(w)]F[L(w), d( ),k(•)] - pk(•)(l-b(•)] -rd(•)+ R(•).
This represents the maximum available gross profit attainable from aw
household.

We assume that each landowner maximizes utility by choosing

the number of each type of contract to offer subject to resource constraints.
In addition to land and capital availability each landlord is con
strained by having only a finite amount of own labor-time.

The landlords

own labor time must be divided between self-cultivatio n, leisure, and the
l4 r is the landlords valuation of a unit of land. If there is an organized
land rental market r is the rental price of land. If there is no organized
rental market r must represent an opportunity cost of land to the landlord.
For example, r could be the marginal product of land when the landlord has to
work his property with own labor alone. In the latter case r's would differ
across landlords.

-23monitoring-supervision requirements of the various tenancy contracts ne
gotiated.

I am going to assume that the monitor-supervision technology

depends only upon the type of tenancy and exhibits a particular kind of
constant returns to scale.

Define

T ti, Tsi, and TRi

to be the labor

i • d,k;

times required to enforce and supervise a wage laborer, sharecropper, or
renter operating with exactly one unit of land and capital.

Then if T(w)

is the labor-time required for aw-tenancy;

depending upon whether i • 1 s, or R.
vise and enforce tenancy contracts is

scale of operation.

The labor-time required to super
assumed to be proportional to the

This assumption will be discussed later.

Each landlord has a utility function v(•,~), depending on profit
and labor.

Let nj(w) equal the number of contracts offered tow-house

holds by landlord j.
Max

Then the allocation problem undertaken is

V[rn(w,c)nj(w), rT(w)nj(w)]

nj(w)£R

+

subject to
1)

2)

This is a standard concave nonlinear programming problem with linear con
straints.

Denote the solution values by
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[n

j

*· 1
1
(w ,U(w ,c)),

1

k

where w ,•••w

...

are the available wealth levels.

of wi-households and J the number of landowners.
D)

J
t: Tlj(wi,U(•))~N(wi)
j=l

i

Let N(w) equal the number
In equilibrium we require

i = l,•••k.

with
E)

i
i
U[w ,C]~U[w ]

i

if the strict inequality holds for w

in D.

The first set of k inequalities are the familiar demand supply re
lationships.

The final condition requires some comment.

For ordinary physi

cal connnodities if the strict inequality held in equilibrium in the first
relationship we would say that the commodity is in redundant supply and in
that case its' reward would have to fall to zero.

The reward of required

labor cannot however, fall to zero if workers are to survive for a length
of time sufficient to perform the required tasks.
that requirement.

Condition E expresses

If the supply of contracts to some w-households (the de

mand for w-tenants) falls short of the supply of w-tenants, the utility
level of those w-households who find tenancies must be at best U(w).

Note

that in this case not only will the allocation not likely be equivalent to
a competitive equilibrium, a competitive equilibrium may very well not ex
ist.

One of the crucial assumptions required to prove the existence of a

general competitive equilibrium is that all consumers be in the interior of
their consumption sets.

A condition incompatible with a minimum subsis

tence level of utility.

It is in this sense that competitive equilibrium

and therefore the competitive model is incompatible with extreme poverty.
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This is a condition that students of development economics should recognize
more often.
We see that the equilibrium outcome emitted by the market process
may exhibit surplus labor with thousands of households either starving or
barely subsisting.

Such conditions must surely foster patronage and per

haps a concomitant situation of moral and social exploitation as too many
starving households seek too few available tenancies.

Given such a scene

it is not at all surprising that an observer might label the economic sys
tem as exploitative.
If the landlord had an exogenously given price to value own labor
time, her resource allocation problem could be formulated as a linear pro
gram with the objective

Max

I:1T(w)n(w).

n(w)

By convention I assume 1T(w') = w, one unit
weal th.

of

In the present formulation no such price exists so the landlord will have
to derive the value of own labor internally.

With this in mind we assume

that the objective function takes the form

1
k
V[n ,•·•n ]

~

i
i
I:'IT(w )n(w) + U[I:T(w i )n(w i )].

With U(•) decreasing and concave,V[ ••] will possess a negative semi-defin
ite Hessian matrix and thus be concave.
Distributive Properties of Monopolistic Equilibrium
We may conveniently use well known results of nonlinear programming
to derive qualitative properties of equilibrium.
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From the concavity of both the objective and constraint functions
of the landlord's maximization problem we know that the Kuhn~Tucker con
ditions are both necessary and sufficient for a utility maximal vector of
tenant demands.

Furthermore it is straightforward to show that an opti

mum actually. ·exists.

Therefore we know that there exists for each land

lord j a pair of nonnegative multipliers [blj' b j]
2
F)

av• 1r(w,c) +av• T(w)3b d(w) + b Z(w)
a1r
aT
lj
2j

such that

for each w with

Z(w) = p[l-b(w)]k(w).
Furthermore equality holds in F if and only if

Duality theory tells us that the bij are the shadow or imputed values of
land and capital to landowner j.

They are in units of utility since the

objective function is a utility function.

:

b1 . • an
. J

Alj•b]j/

, av

av,I

In j *(•) ,

therefore

is in units of profit per unit of land.

Define

I a,;
....
Alj in the same way with units profit per unit cf capital. l.'.f_..,,,,
•ua..J..•:,,
av /av
ting A3j "' aT / air with units profit per unit of labor-time, the A 's
ij
.a.

are the imputed values of resources in terms of profit.

From equation F

for all w with nj*(w)>O.
Landlord j enters into a contract with a tenant of wealth w only if the
imputed value of the resources given up are just equal to the profit earned.

-27This is an obvious requirement since its violation would mean the land
lord was not allocating his resources optimally.
Remark 2:

From equation G we see that the profit earned by any landlord
on each tenancy contract is just equal to the imputed value
of the land, capital, and labor-time devoted to that tenancy
contract by the landlord.

In order to develop distributive properties further we need the
following facts.
Fact 1:

If the landlord unilaterally chooses the amount of capital in
put then,

Furthermore if the tenant agrees with the capital input;
a(w) • b(w) and Fk • ~-

Proof:

For the first relationship note that the first order condition
with respect to k of the landlord's initial maximization,
equation C
, is;
[1-a(•••)]Fk__ - ~
3k F - p(l-b) = O.

From the offer curve,

aa

-= -

ck

From which it follows

Fk

p.

E

To derive the second result note that if the choice of capital
input belongs to the tenant the offer curve of aw-household
is represented by
U[aF(L,d,k) + w-pkb,L] - U

a

0

= 0.

-28a and k can be solved for in teTI!ls of the other variables, a(L,d,b,U,w),
k(L,d,b,U,w).

Computing the Jacobien of this pair of equations gives

F

ak
ab

pk

.

aa
ab

p

hence assuming Fkk<O;

since constant returns implies
also

A landlord choosing a contract to offer aw-household gets the following
first order condition with respect to b;

Rearranging and substituting gives

ok
ab

((1-a)Fk - (1-b)p "" 0.

ak/clb <0

and

implies

a -= b.

Q.E.D.

If the tenant has the right of capital input choice not only will
capital be applied to the ~oil until its marginal product equals its price,
but the tenant and landlord will share the costs of capital in the same
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proportions as they share output.

This means that both will agree upon

the amount of capital to be used.

However, if the landlord chooses capi

tal input the marginal product of capital will equal its price, but noth
ing can be inferred about the relation between cost and output shares.
The landlord who has the power to unilaterally make input choices may
force the tenant to bear a greater share of input costs than the tenant
desires.

We shall have more to say about this below.

We may unambiguously note that on rented land a(w)

Remark 3:

= b(w) = 1

so,

If the supervision-monitoring costs incurred from renting land
are negligible,

We have that the profit per acre accruing to the landlord on
rented land is just the imputed rental value of the land,

w(w).,
'l.lj ""

d (w)

R(w)
d (w) '

The landlord who does not share in the cost of capital does not share in
the return to capital.
Proposition 3: Profit per acre is identical on all rental tenancies leased
out by a given landlord.
It also follows that
Proposition 4: Profit per acre is higher on both wage worked and share
cropped land than on rented land.

-30It is not possible through a-priori means to determine relative profit
per acre on wage worked and share-cropped land.

The reason for this is

that the marginal product of labor need not be equated on all tenancies.
It.is straightforward to show that
Fact 2:

for all employed tenants.
Proof:

From equation C the landlords first order condition with re
spect to L for maximizing the profit from aw-household is;

The tenant's utility constraint can be used to compute

-- aa
oL

Substituting in the first order condition and simplifying
gives
F

L

=

Q.E.D.

Nothing in the model guarantees that all tenants' MRS be equated.

But it

might reasonably be argued that since the landlord controls the allocation
of labor on his land by wage-workers and sharecroppers he will ensure that
marginal products of labor are equated on each acre of land.

Not doing

so implies that landlords income can be increased with no loss to the ten
ants.

In this case the marginal product of all factors are equated on

land worked by wage hands and sharecroppers and it follows that each ten
ant on a given farm works with the same amount of capital per unit of
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land.

15

Then since

1T (w)

d(w)
the assumption that monitoring- supervision costs are lower on sharecroppe d
land implies higher profit per acre on wage worked land since for wage
workers
a(w) •_b(w)

c

O.

In this last case it follows that output per acre is identical on
all tenancies under the supervision of a given landlord~
Remark 4:

15

The fact that the marginal product of a tenant's labor is equal
to his marginal rate of substitutio n between consumption and
labor should not mislead the reader into making the usual wel
fare judgement. The payment to the worker has not been deter
mined in a competitive market of the usual sort. Therefore
the wage will resemble a competitive wage only if workers of
a given type are not in surplus SU.J)ply. In figure 3 a wage
worker has b·een allocated k and d capital and land to work
with. 'nle production set ia represented by the shaded area.
There are decreasing returns to labor with fixed capital and
land. The curve cc represents the lower boundary of the agent's
consumption possibility set. This set is the set of labor
consumptio n.allocation s (c,L) that are biologicall y possible
for the agent. I have assumed that cc is differentia ble and
that all points on or above cc and in the graph are in the
consumption set. The curve cO is the workers competitive of
fer curve. The locus of labor-incom e pairs chosen by the work
er at a given wage in a setting of perfect competition . The
line Ow* is a representat ive budget line with slope w* a com
petitive wage. The indifferenc e curve ffij intersectin g the of
fer curve cO and tangent to the budget line at the intersec
tion point shows the consumer's optimal choice at the wage w*.
Let us assume that w* is the competitive equilibrium wage if
there were perfect markets and only wage and rental contracts.
In the actual imperfect economy there is a low demand for wage
workers relative to their supply. The landlord faces no utility
constraint in hiring wage-worker s so he gives them the all or
nothing offer [L*,C* = R(w)] placing them on the lower boundary
of their consumption set. Note that it is to the landlord's ad-

The last statement follows from the fact that Fd =rand Fk = p.

-32vantage to place the worker at that point where the slope of
cc is equal to the marginal product of labor given k,d. If
the landlord faced a real utility constraint the same result
would follow, but cc-would be an indifference curve. In this
particular example the competitive equilibrium allocates the
worker more income with less labor supply then the monopolis
tic allocation.
In the example above the worker is miserably poor and since he is allocated off his offer curve he has not been given a free choice in a mar
ket situation in the sense of a competitive equilibrium. 16
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This example should be compared to similar remarks made by G. Myrdal
in [11] chapter 11, sec. 9. It also explains the practice of workers in
India or Latin American Latifundios receiving fixed sum yearly wages. In
a forthcoming paper I discuss this problem of poverty and surplus labor in
a more systematic fashion.

-33The Choice of Contract
The model of monopolistic competition presented here offers two
reasons for the existence of share contracts in the presence of wage and
rental contracts.

Firstly, we have argued that landlords will seek to sign

share contracts with tenants who are able to provide additional capital.
Working an acre of land with wage labor may be individually more profit
able than leasing the acre to a sharecropper, but if the landlord is short
of capital she may find entering into a share arrangement advantageous as
the gains from the tenant's input of capital more than compensate for the
share of output the tenant receives.

One motivation for share tenancy is

to provide a substitute for an imperfect credit market.

If there are in

creasing returns to capital over relevant ranges of the production func
tion this motivation for entering share arrangements would become very im
portant.

The second reason for entering share agreements offered by the

monopolistic model relies on the assumption that the monitoring-supervisory
costs of a share contract are less than the costs of wage contracts.
is really the incentives argument.

This

One presumes that the reason for the

lever coats is the fact that share tenants have incentives not to shirk.

This aspect of the model explains one important empirical phenomenon.

In

many share contracts all the capital input is actually provided by the
landlord with the tenant's share of the cost subtracted from his income
at the end of the season.

Why are such contracts signed?

what are the possible benefits over the two alternatives?

We must ask
Given the incen

tive affects and the lower supervision-monitoring costs of share contracts
there is a trade-off between higher profit per acre on wage contracts and
lower labor-time disutility with share contracts.

Surely for some land-

-34lords the tradeoff will involve the use of both kinds of contracts.

How

ever, it is reasonable to ask why the agents do not enter rental contracts.
If the credit market were perfect this would be a possibility.

In the

absence of outside credit the tenants we are currently discussing would
have no capital to add to the land.

to extend inside credit.
lord its opportunity cost.

In that case the landlord would have

But such credit would have to earn for the land
The landlord would desire full return from both

her capital and her land leaving the tenant only the return to his own
This reduces the tenant to a wage laborer and an unsupervised one

labor.
at that!

Therefore, the share contract is seen to offer distinct advan

tages.

The model explains the existence of share contracts without recourse
to any arguments concerning risk sharing.

To prevent any confusion on this

point I have refrained from introducing uncertainty in this paper.
does have some fundamental drawbacks.

This

To understand why credit markets

are imperfect, and why tenants must be monitored and supervised one must
invoke problems of assymmetric information and moral hazard.
siderations force a consideration of uncertainty.

These con

If information is in

complete and costly, and production is risky in a nontrivial way so that
choice of technique and inputs can alter the distribution of outpot across
states, a lender of capital will want some control over the disposition of
that capital.

Especially if there is a chance that the loan will be de

faulted the lender will want some role in the investment decision.

Such

considerations reveal that it is no accident that landlords are often the

primary source of credit in rural economies.

Even in cases where the land

lord is not the tenant's actual source of credit he is often something of
an intermediary (co-signer), without whom credit would not be forthcoming.
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If information about the tenant's activities is costly a resident landlord
is likely to be in the best position to ensure that the lender's capital is
used in a way favorable to the lender's position.

This offers a second

reason why landlords lend capital to landless and low wealth share tenants.
The landlords are able to extract not only a share of the productive return
to capital on the land, but are also able to charge tenants an interest fee
for use of the capital.

A, perhaps the major impetus to the use of share

contracts is as a substitute for an imperfect credit system.

This position

is implicit in Alfred Marshall's short, but incisive critique of the Euro
pean Metayer and American share systems.

According to Marshall the share

system,
"

enables a man who has next to no capital of his

own to obtain the use of it at a lower charge than he

could in any other way, and to have more freedom and
responsibility than he would as a hired laborer; and
thus the plan has many of the advantages of the three
1110dern systems of co-operation, profit sharing, and
payment by piece-work."
Alternatively, a prospective tenant with a relative abundance of capital

end little or no
capital.

to &cquira more land or lend the

In the latter case the same reasons listed above for landlords

will cause the tenant to desire some control over the use of his capital.
If the capital holding is not substantial enough to support a rental ten
ancy a share contract allows the agent to acquire land, lend his capital,
and maintain some control over its use.

Again Marshall is worth quoting;

II

the landlord can deliberately and freely arrange
the amount of capital and labor supplied by the tenant
and the amount of capital supplied by himself to suit
the exigencies of each special case."
It seems clear to me that Marshall is in the two passages above implicitly
assuming an imperfect credit market!

The argument put forth in this paper maintains that the existence
of market imperfectio ns are crucial in the determinati on of the organiza
tion of production and distributio n in an agrarian economy.

I have

· argued that the major impetuses to share contracting are imperfect capi
tal markets and tenant incentives or monitoring costs.

The first which

is in my opinion more important, has been largely ignored in the litera
ture.

It is important to ask; what differences are there in the implica

tions of the present model and alternative s and how do they fit the facts?
The major differences are sketched below.
a)

Mixed tenure

The monopolisti c model not only explains the
existence of share-contr acts it implies that
different forms of tenure will exist under
the same landlord.

b)

Differentia ted contracts

Contracts signed by tenants differing in im
portant economic characteris tics, such as
wealth, will reflect those differences . The
share of output accruing to the tenant will
be an increasing function of wealth and will
vary precisely with the share of input costs.

c)

Distributio n theory

The return to landlords and tenants under al
ternative tenancy arrangement s will not be
identical.

With the exception of the model constructed by J.E. Stiglitz, I know of no
other model that allows landlords to mix tenures on their property.

However,

the Stiglitz model relies upon differences in preferences over risk among
agents to get the result.

More importantly , except for the extreme case

where either tenants or landlords are risk neutral one will never observe
tenants working under pure wage or rental contracts in the Stiglitz model.
The evidence clearly supports the monopolisti c model on this point.

Since

no other model places a major emphasis upon imperfect capital markets they
do not imply the wealth affect on contracts.

The second quote from Marshall's

Principles of Economics is the closest statement of the wealth affect I have

-37found.

What eviden ce if any is availa ble to suppo rt the conten tions
of

the model?

Curiou sly, J.S. Mill, who expres sly took the view that share

contra cts were largel y drawn up by custom offers in his chapte
r "on Metay ers"
-a fair amoun t of eviden ce that the Europe an share system admitt
ed quite a
variet y of contra ctual arrang ement s.

In fact it is somewhat striki ng to

infer someth ing of a corres ponde nce betwee n the share of output
going to
the tenant and the share of variab le input costs he pays.

Mill's remark s

(page 303) seem to imply that the geneta l rule was one-h alf-on
e-half with
the share changi ng in exact propo rtion as the tenant contri buted
more or
less of indivi sible capita l goods like livest ock or plough s.

Since this

is precis ely what theory predic ts should happen it is intere sting
to in
quire wheth er this is an accide nt.
One time period and geogra phical locati on where the terms of
land
tenure contra cts were subjec t 'to little legal interf erence and
thus likely
to reflec t the econom ic power of the agents is the Southe rn United
States
cotton belt from about 1875 to 1925.

The table below repres ents the terms

of the four most common types of contra cts signed .

The report ed arran ge-

ments seem almos t to close to the theore tical predic tions to
be believ ed.
I person ally find it hard to believ e that marke t partic ipants
unders tood
the econom ics of the cost-s hare lease in the way we have discus
sed it in
this paper.

How do we explai n the exact relatio nship betwee n fertil izer

cost and outpu t shares ?

First, as I have argued throug hout the paper, if

credit marke ts are imper fect, landlo rds, and tenant s with collat
eral, those

with tools and stock, may find it advant ageous to pool their financ
ial re-

-38sources when applying fertilizer to the land.

Fact one tells us that

unless the landlord has considerable monopolistic power, so that he can
unilaterally make all contract terms, a decision to share fertilizer costs
_impels the parties to share output if efficiency is to result.

In the

case of one-half croppers, if fertilizer,increases crop yields appreciably,

the landlord would not want to share the increased output unless the ten
ant shared costs.

If the landlord cannot completely control the tenants

actual input of fertilizer, it will be important for the tenant to agree
on the total input.17

More generally the incentive affects of the contract

will surely depend upon whether the tenant believes he is being treated
fairly.
References to share tenancy in India seems to indicate that a con
siderable amount of cost-share leasing is practiced.

According to the ex

amples reported by Francine R. Frankel, a strqng percentage of these con
tracts have identical share proportions.' A good deal of empirical work is
called for before this question can be addressed adequately.
The differences in the distributive implications of the monopolis
tic model are perhaps the most basic.

No other model imples that factor

returns will differ under alternative tenancy arrangements.
tive models are weakest on this point.

The competi-

S. Cheung states flatly that re

turns under alternative contracts must be identical or the less profitable
ones would not be used.

That statement implicitly assumes that all mar

kets including credit markets are perfect.

An indication that this is not

true is the practice of renting land and then subleasing the same land under

17

One lack of control may be a blackmarket where the tenant could sell
part of the fertilizer.
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Table 1

Share-cropping

Share-renting

Pure renting

Landlord supplies

Land, fuel, tools , cab in,
work stock seed, 1/2 fertilizer1 feed for stock

Land, fuel, cabin, 1/4
or 1/3 fertilizer

Land, fuel, cabin

Tenant supplies

Labor, 1/2 fertilizer

Workstock tools, seed
feed for stock, 3/4 or
2/3 fertilizer

Workstock tools, seed
feed. for stock, 3/4
or 2/3 fertilizer

Landlord receives

1/2 crop

1/4 or 1/3 crop

Fixed amount in cash
or cotton

Tenant receives

1/2 crop

3/4 or 2/3 crop

Total crop minus fixed
rent

Source:

Boeger, E.A. and Goldenweiser, E.A., A Study of the Tenant Systems of Farming in the Yazoo-Mississippi
Delta. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bulletin 337, 1916. Reprinted in Woofter, Thomas, Landlord
and Tenant on the Cotton Plantat:Lon.

-39a share contract.

According to Thomas J. Edwards and others this was a

frequent practice in the U.S. cotton belt.
The demise of sharecropping
Why has share-contracting in agriculture declined in virtually all
developed economies?

Since the model gives essentially two motivations

for the use of share-contracts it also gives two reasons for its demise.
The process of economic development necessarily requires the establishment
of well organized credit markets.

In the presence of competitive credit

lines the cost-sharing motive for share-contracts will disappear for both
parties, but particularly for the tenant with some initial wealth.
second reason is technological change.

The

As new production techniques and

capital goods are introduced and made available, because of better access
to credit the use of share-contracts may become increasingly inadequate
as a means of lowering supervision-monitoring costs.

In this paper, I

assumed that these costs were subject to constant returns to land and capi
tal.

But the introduction of highly productive and expensive machinery is

not only likely to make this assumption absurd, but will introduce increas
ing returns in the production function.
loath to share
workers.

This will make landlords very

the returns to mechanized capital with landless and poor

Finally, the indivisibilities involved will probably cause small

landowners to rent or sell their holdings to larger mechanized landowners.
Conclusions
Is sharecropping an efficient production arrangement?

This has been

one of the central questions addressed by those writing about systems of
land tenure.

The question has been misconceived.

Asking whether an econ-

-40omy using share-contracts achieves a Pareto Efficient allocation is to
completely ignore the question why do societies use share-contracts ?

Share

contracts are a response to the presence of significant market imperfections
and questions about efficiency require that economists descend into con
siderations of the second-best.

The analysis presented here implies that

share-contract using economies will not be Pareto Efficient.

Inputs and

output per acre may differ across farms and marginal rates of substitution
may differ across individuals.

Whether or not the economy is efficient

given the market and institutional constraints is not an easy question to
answer.
Anyone can make the assumption that all markets exist and are per
fect and pretend that allocations are efficient.

Economists interested in

development and agrarian policy cannot afford to confine themselves to those
models alone.
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